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Abstract 
 
Good monetary policy requires estimates of all of its effects: monetary policy impacts 
traditional economic variables such as output, unemployment rates, and inflation.   But 
does monetary policy influence crime rates?  By extending the vector autoregression 
literature, we derive estimates of the dynamic effect of higher interest rates on crime 
rates.  Higher interest rates have socially and statistically significant positive effects on 
rates of theft and knife robberies, while effects on rates of burglary and assault are 
smaller and statistically insignificant.  Higher interest rates have no effect on homicide 
rates.  We conclude that monetary policy influences the rate of economically-motivated 
crimes.   
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I.  Introduction 
 
  Many observers have investigated the potential factors affecting crime in the U.S.  The 
existing literature has suggested three sets of factors.  Earlier studies focus on a benefit and cost 
analysis of committing crime (Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1973, 1981, 1996; and Levitt, 1997).  The 
second set of studies relates crime rates to the state of the economy (Imrohoroğlu, Merlo and 
Rupert, 2001).  Finally, more recent studies argue that labor market conditions (wages and 
unemployment) can explain changes in crime rate (Freeman, 1996, 1999; Raphael and Winter-
Ebmer, 2001; Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard, 2002).  Regarding unemployment, the existing 
empirical evidence has produced mixed results (Freeman, 1996, 1999). The potential effect of 
wages on crime is generally ignored in the literature.  Grogger (1998) and Gould, Weinberg, and 
Mustard (2002) have recently tackled this issue and found that wage movements, along with 
other factors such as unemployment, are a significant determinant of crime. 
  This paper differs from the existing literature in several significant ways.  First, this paper 
is the first to examine whether crime rates in the U.S. are responsive to monetary policy shocks.  
Second, our study can be interpreted as an extension of the above studies that explain crime rates 
based on the state of the economy and labor market conditions.  Monetary policy shocks, by 
directly influencing the economic conditions, including the labor market, may affect crime 
decisions.  Therefore, our empirical results have vital policy implications.  If monetary policy 
affects crime significantly, then central banks may choose to include crime as a factor in their 
objective function when designing an optimal policy. Third, we develop a time-series 
econometric technique that does not require us to create full-blown structural models of crime, 
but which can nonetheless estimate the dynamic effect of an exogenous change in interest rates 
on crime rates.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our empirical 
methodology followed by data description in Section 3. Empirical findings are reported in 
Section IV. Final section discusses the policy implications of our results and concludes the paper. 
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II.  Methodology 
 
In this section, we make use of the fact that any vector autoregression (VAR) can be 
represented as a much simpler vector moving average (VMA) process.  Our ultimate objective is 
to econometrically estimate one set of equations from the VMA process, equations that estimate 
the impact of monetary policy shocks on crime rates.   
We are interested in the time-series properties of an ((m+n) x 1) vector of covariance-
stationary variables, yt.  We will stack the variables so that the m crime variables are on top, and 
the n economic variables are on the bottom:  
 y t =   


 


ec
t
cr
t
y
y
           ( 1 )  
In the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) literature, the current values of yt 
depend partially on the lagged values of all of the elements of yt: For example, this month’s 
unemployment rate might be related to last month’s unemployment rate and last month’s level of 
industrial production.   
In addition, some elements of this month’s yt will be affected by other elements of this 
month’s yt; when the Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate, for example, their decision will 
depend on that month’s consumer price index and that month’s industrial production.  This latter 
situation—where some elements of yt depend on other elements of yt, could conceivably lead to 
a classic problem of simultaneous equations, but as we will see, econometric techniques have 
been developed (summarized by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2000)) that provide a 
tractable solution to this potential problem.  Therefore, let us consider the following equation, 
which jointly characterizes the U.S. economy and the regional economy we are interested in:   
 y t = α + Φ0yt  + Φ1yt-1 + 
. . . + Φpyt-p + εt         (2) 
 
Here, α is an (m+n)x1 vector, the Φ matrices are (m+n)x(m+n), and εt is a vector of 
(m+n)x1 shocks to the national and regional economy.  These shocks εt are assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed, with a diagonal covariance matrix, denoted D. This 
implies that there are a total of (m+n) shocks hitting the economy each period, but while the 
diagonal covariance matrix implies that the same-period shocks are uncorrelated with each other, 
it is possible for each shock to influence more than one element of yt.       3
For instance, if there is a shock to industrial production this month, that will, of course, 
immediately influence industrial production; and since this month’s federal funds rate depends in 
part on this month’s industrial production, the industrial production shock will simultaneously 
influence this month’s federal funds rate.  The combination of same-period relationships between 
the elements of yt is contained within the matrix Φ0.  For now, we will simply note that as long 
as Φ0 is invertible, we can make the following transformation:  
 ( I – Φ0)yt = α + Φ1yt-1 + 
. . . + Φpyt-p + εt         (3)  
 
 y t = (I – Φ0)
–1α + (I – Φ0)
–1Φ1yt-1 + 
. . . + (I – Φ0)
–1Φpyt-p + (I – Φ0)
–1εt   (4) 
 
and if we define a =  (I – Φ0)
–1α, and Pi = (I – Φ0)
–1Φi, this can be rewritten as 
 
 y t = a + P1yt-1 + 
. . . + Ppyt-p + (I – Φ0)
–1εt        (5) 
  
Note that in this format, the covariance matrix of et is now ((I – Φ0)
–1)D((I – Φ0)
–1) , and 
hence is unlikely to be a diagonal matrix.  This implies that the contemporaneous relationships 
between the elements of yt are now reflected in the covariance matrix of the disturbance terms.   
Our eventual goal is to uncover the underlying disturbances to monetary policy, in order 
to estimate the effects of these exogenous disturbances on local variables; therefore, we are 
interested in how the monetary policy disturbance (one of the n  nationwide elements of εt) 
effects some of the m local elements of yt.  This motivates us to rewrite (5) as follows, using L as 
the lag operator, where L
pyt = yt-p: 
 ( I – P1L
1
 – 
. . .
  – PpL
p)yt = a + (I – Φ0)
–1εt       ( 6 )  
 
 y t = (I – P1L
1
 – 
. . .
  – PpL
p)
–1a + (I – P1L
1
 – 
. . .
  – PpL
p)
–1(I – Φ0)
–1εt    (7) 
 
The first term on the right hand side of the equation is a constant equal to the mean of the 
process.  This is so because if we take unconditional expectations of both sides,  
 E(yt) = E((I – P1L
1
 – 
. . .
  – PpL
p)
–1a) + E((I – P1L
1
 – 
. . .
  – PpL
p)
–1(I – Φ0)
–1εt) (8) 
 
and since the expected value of εt=0, an i.i.d. (m+n) vector of zeroes,      4
   
 E(yt) = E((I – P1L
1
 – 
. . .
  – PpL
p)
–1a) + 0       ( 9 )  
 
Hence, we will simplify notation by referring to (I – P1L
1
  – 
. . .
    – PpL
p)
–1a) as y .  
Hamilton (1992, pps 257-260) demonstrates that any covariance-stationary vector process such 
as this one can be rewritten as a infinite-lag vector moving-average process.  This is the vector 
extension of the fact that any finite-order autoregressive process has an infinite-order moving 
average representation.  Therefore, we have: 
 y t = y + (I – Φ0)
–1εt +  ψ1(I – Φ0)
–1εt-1 + ψ2(I – Φ0)
–1εt-2 + 
. . .
     (10) 
 
If the process is covariance-stationary, then the infinite lags will approach zero matrices.  
The reader interested in how to construct the ψi  matrices is referred to Hamilton’s (1992) 
excellent treatment of the issue.   
Equation (10) indicates that if we had access to a time series for any one of the 
disturbance equations, ε
i
t (e.g., a set of monetary policy disturbances), and also had time series 
for one of the elements of y
cr
t, (e.g., the U.S. burglary rate), then we could regress the burglary 
rate on the monetary policy disturbances and a constant, and the result would be unbiased, 
asymptotically valid estimates of individual element of the (m+n)x(m+n) matrices ψi(I – Φ0)
–1.  
These coefficients would be reduced form estimates of the dynamic effect of monetary policy 
disturbances on local unemployment.  We would not, within this framework, be able to estimate 
the precise channel through which monetary policy shocks impacted the burglary rate—it could 
be through money balances, deferred investment, worsening asymmetric information problems in 
credit markets, etc.  The coefficient estimates would summarize the interaction among the 
various elements of the Φi matrices. 
If we provide a set of estimates for ε
m
t, the monetary policy disturbances, then we can 
validly exclude the other elements of εt because those elements are, by assumption, uncorrelated 
with ε
m
t at all leads and lags.  This means that omitted-variables bias is not an issue, although the 
standard errors on the estimated coefficients will be smaller than if we used all the elements of 
ε
m
t in the regression (Goldberger (1991), p. 190).  Therefore, our estimates will appear “too 
accurate,” on average.       5
Fortunately, there is a well-established macroeconometric literature that has established a 
method for estimating the monetary policy disturbances ε
m
t.  This literature is surveyed by 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2000), who were pioneers in this area.  Importantly for our 
purposes, we can further demonstrate that an accurate estimate of these disturbances can be 
obtained without the use of information on the behavior of y
cr
t, the national crime rates.   
We will demonstrate the second proposition first:  The estimation of ε
m
t does not depend 
upon information about y
cr
t.  We begin by assuming that economic variables can have an effect 
on crime rates, but crime rates have no effect, either in the current period or in the future, on the 
economic variables.  Another way of stating our assumption is that the crime variables contain 
no unique information about the dynamic behavior of the national economy.  This assumption 
imposes the following restriction on the shape of the Φi matrices, for i = 0, 1, ... , p, where Φ
X,Y
i 
is an appropriately shaped submatrix:  
  Φi =   


 
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i
ec , cr
i
cr , cr
i
0
        ( 1 1 )  
  
Given this form, the top row of coefficients have no feedback effects on the bottom row 
of coefficients; combine this with the assumption that the εt shocks are uncorrelated with each 
other, and we can conclude that crime rates have no effect on the national economy.  To make 
this explicit, we rewrite (2) in the following format: 
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 + εt (12)  
 
We will generate estimates of ε
m
t directly from this equation, focusing our attention on 
the bottom n rows of the coefficient matrices, which are completely unaffected by the upper m 
rows of the same matrices.   
At this point, we can make use of the decade-old literature on monetary policy shocks, 
pioneered by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, and summarized and surveyed in their jointly 
authored book chapter in the Handbook of Macroeconomics (2000).  They make use of a     6
recursive estimation strategy, mentioned at the beginning of this section, in which some variables 
higher in the recursive ordering can affect those lower in the ordering within the current period, 
but not vice-versa.  Thus, in their benchmark model, within a given period, output, the price 
level, and an index of commodities prices can have an effect on this period’s federal funds rate, 
but we assume that this period’s federal funds rate cannot have any affect on these three 
variables within the period.  For a time period of a month, this is a very good assumption.  For a 
quarter, it may stretch credulity a bit, but not by too much. We can represent this relationship 
algebraically as follows; we can think of this as one of the rows of equation (12), where Φ
ffr,ec
i is 
the row of the Φ
ec,ec
i matrix corresponding to the federal funds rate:   
 ffrt = ipt + cpit + ppit + Φ
ffr,ec
1
  y
ec
t-1 + Φ
ffr,ec
2y
ec
t-2  + 
… + Φ
ffr,ec
py
ec
t-k +  ε
m
t   (13) 
 
When we estimate the equation, the residuals from this equation, 
m
t ε ˆ , become our 
estimate of the true disturbance to monetary policy, the regressor that we use to estimate the 
effect of monetary policy disturbances on crime variables.    
Finally, we note that our method of estimating the dynamic effects of monetary policy on 
other time-series variables is mentioned approvingly in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(2000):   
“The recursiveness assumption justifies the following two-step procedure for estimating 
the dynamic response of a variable to a monetary policy shock.  First, estimate the policy 
shocks by the fitted residuals in the ordinary least squares regression of St [the measure of 
monetary policy, here, the federal funds rate] on the elements of Ωt [the current and 
lagged variables that have an effect on St].  Second, estimate the dynamic response of a 
variable to a monetary policy shock by regressing the variable on the current and lagged 
values of the estimated policy shocks.”   
Our extension this literature relies entirely on the realization that crime rates are not an 
element of Ωt, although they are affected by all of the elements of Ωt, as well as by the federal 
funds rate.  By regressing crime rates onto the first 12 monthly lags of 
m
t ε ˆ , we will avoid the 
difficulties of creating structural models of crime, while generating estimates of the effect of 
interest rate shocks on crime rates.    
The specification for the federal funds rate portrayed in equation (13) has been examined 
repeatedly in the literature, and it has withstood scrutiny.  A recent article in the Journal of     7
Money, Credit, and Banking, entitled, “Should we throw the VAR out with the bathwater?” 
(Brunner, 2000) is only the latest critique that concludes that this specification generates useful 
estimates of monetary policy shocks that are comparable to estimated policy shocks using more 
dynamic, forward-looking models of the federal funds rate.  Therefore, we have concluded that 
the most widely-cited, heavily tested model in the literature is the model that we should use in 
our research into the effect of monetary policy on crime.  To our knowledge, this is the first 
application of this methodology to crime.  
 
 III.  Data 
 
Our monthly nationwide crime data come from the National Institute of Justice’s Uniform 
Crime Reports, made available at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social 
Research’s (ICPSR) website.  Data run from January 1975 to December 1993, and cover a range 
of violent and nonviolent crimes.  We divide the monthly level of crime by that month’s U.S. 
population, as estimated by the Bureau of the Census, and all crime measures are measured in 
incidents per month per million Americans.  Figures 1 and 2 report the crime rates studied in this 
paper.   
Our monthly macroeconomic data on industrial production, the consumer and producer 
price indices, the federal funds rate, and total and nonborrowed bank reserve come from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database.  Our estimate of the monetary policy 
shocks, a VAR from 1960 to 2000 with 12 monthly lags, with the causal ordering of industrial 
production, consumer prices, producer prices, fed funds rate, nonborrowed reserves, total 
reserves, is standard in the monetary policy literature, as mentioned above, and so we will deal 
directly with the estimated monetary policy shocks, 
m
t ε ˆ .  We can think of these shocks as shifts 
in short-term interest rates that cannot be explained by current and past economic variables: They 
are the unpredictable component of Federal Reserve interest rate policy.  Their time-series 
properties 
m
t ε ˆ can be described simply as white noise with essentially zero mean: Since they are 
the residuals from a VAR process with 12 lags, this is not surprising.  Of the 228 observations 
falling in the 75-93 period, there is, however, one outlier: In May of 1980, during President 
Jimmy Carter’s reelection campaign, the Federal Reserve cut interest rates massively in an effort 
to revive an economy in steep recession only to reverse this cut a few months later, after Ronald     8
Reagan become the new U.S. president.  This large, temporary rate cut creates a statistically 
important outlier: 
m
t ε ˆ  in May 1980 is –4.25 percent, while the standard deviation of 
m
t ε ˆ  is 0.42 
percent.  Therefore, this outlier is 10 standard deviations below the mean.  Therefore, we drop 
this observation from all our estimates.  The next-largest outlier is +2.25 percent, about 5 
standard deviations above the mean, and the rest of the 
m
t ε ˆ  distribution is approximately normal 
(skewness 1, kurtosis 7.2 when the May 1980 observation is omitted, while kurtosis leaps to 21.5 
if May 1980 is included). 
 
IV.  Crime and Monetary Policy, 1975-1993 
 
  To estimate the effect of monetary policy shocks on crime rates, we regress this month’s 
crime rate (incidents per month per million) on eleven monthly calendar dummies (since crimes 
exhibit strong seasonality, with violent crimes peaking in the summer), a constant, and lags zero 
through twenty-four of the monetary policy shocks, 
m
t ˆ λ − ε , λ= 0,...24.  Crime rates per million 
appear to be mean-reverting, so nonstationarity should not be an important econometric problem.  
The coefficients for 
m
t ˆ λ − ε  can be interpreted as the effect of a one-percent increase in interest rates 
on month t’s crime rate.   
  We begin by looking at the effect of monetary policy on broad crime categories (Figure 
3):  In the Uniform Crime Reports, these categories are: homicide, rape, robberies, assaults, 
burglaries, and theft.  Since the calendar dummies are not of interest, we report only coefficients 
for the monetary policy regressors.  While in all six cases, most coefficients are positive, there 
are statistically significant lags only in the case of rape and theft.  The largest and most 
statistically significant coefficients occur around or after the 1-year mark, when interest rate 
policy, according to most economists, begins to have its strongest impact on the economy.   
To make the results across crimes comparable, we calculated semi-elasticities of the 
crime rates with respect to the interest rate, which are also reported in Figure 3.  These semi-
elasticities are the percent change in the average crime rate over the entire two years, where the 
numerator in the average equals the mean coefficient estimate of the 
m
t ˆ λ − ε  regressors, and the 
denominator is the mean monthly crime rate per : In the case of theft—the crime with the largest     9
interest semi-elasticity—the results imply that in the two years after a 1% rise in the interest rate, 
the rate of theft rises 1.5 percent, or about 425 more thefts per million Americans per year.   
  Also, the Durbin-Watson statistics (not reported here) indicate that residuals are strongly 
positively autocorrelated.  This autocorrelation does not change the unbiasedness of the 
coefficient estimates.  This unbiasedness result follows from the fact that we are running a short 
regression, omitting other shocks that are uncorrelated with the monetary policy shocks.   
However, to insure the stability of the results, all reported regressions were also run with AR(1) 
error structures, with no material change in coefficient sizes or statistical significance.   
  Given that the largest semi-elasticity was for an economic crime—theft—it is surprising 
that no statistically significant result was uncovered for robbery.  Perhaps this is because 
aggregation across types of robberies blurs an underlying relationship between monetary policy 
and the propensity to rob.  Accordingly, in Figure 4, we estimated identical regressions, using 
Uniform Crime Report data on robberies committed with guns, with knives, with other weapons, 
and with no weapon at all (so-called “strong-arm robberies”).  Interest rates appear to have their 
strongest and statistically most significant impact on knife robberies, with a two-year average 
semi-elasticity of 2.3%.  This implies 6 more knife robberies per million persons per year 
  Overall, these results support the commonsense hypothesis than when times turn bad, 
some people turn to crime.  But of course, they indicate more than just that.  The results indicate 
that people tend to turn to convenient crimes that promise quick financial gains: Knife robberies 
and theft.  Burglary, a more complicated crime, and gun-assisted robbery, which typically would 
require the perpetrator to invest in a handgun, do not exhibit the sizable elasticities of more 
convenient crimes.  The statistically significant and relatively large semi-elasticity of rates of 
rape we cannot explain, and leave to future researchers.   
 
V.   Policy Implications and Conclusion 
 
Criminals respond to monetary policy: In particular, we have built upon the vector 
autoregression framework to show that rates of knife robbery, theft, and rape rise by socially and 
statistically significant amounts after the Federal Reserve tightens interest rates.  How should this 
result influence monetary policy?  In the optimal monetary policy literature, it is well-established 
that a central bank should reduce the variance of output and of inflation.  More controversial has     10
been the suggestion that the central bank should reduce the variance of interest rates, via interest 
rate smoothing; this despite the fact that numerous studies (e.g., Taylor, Monetary Policy Rules 
(2001)) have demonstrated that the Federal Reserve does, in fact, tend to smooth out changes in 
interest rates.   
Our work, demonstrating a link between the volatility of interest rates and the volatility 
of crime rates, helps establish a socially-motivated reason for such interest-rate smoothing.  If 
governments and private agents face convex adjustment costs of responding to crime rates, then 
stable crime rates are preferable to more volatile crime rates.  For example, if police services 
move directly with crime rates (via higher caseload, longer hours, etc.), and if police services 
have an average cost curve with positive first and second derivatives, then police services will be 
more costly, on average, when crime rates are more volatile.     
These results indicate that stable monetary policy has potential social benefits that extend 
far beyond the traditional macroeconomist’s discussion of unemployment rates and menu costs 
of inflation.  By helping to stabilize crime rates, stable monetary policy can help contribute to 
social welfare in ways that are only beginning to be explored.   
      11
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Figure 3 – The response of crime to interest rates: Main Crime Categories 
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Notes: Y-axis values are crimes per month per million Americans.  Dashed lines represent +/-2 s.e. bands.  The 
reported semi-elasticity is the mean coefficent value divided by the mean crime rate over the entire sample.       16
 
Figure 4 – The response of crime to interest rates: Robbery 
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